Abstract-Higher penetration of renewables like wind power generation will introduce an unprecedented amount of uncertainty into the grid that might severely affect the grid vulnerability to cascading failures. In this study, we propose a mixed OPFstochastic approach to analyze and simulate cascading failures in power grid and to evaluate the impact of wind generation in terms of its penetration and uncertainty level. The proposed approach incorporates both thermal stability model for transmission line outage and automatic power balance algorithms. Numerical simulation results on the IEEE 300 bus system indicate that uncertainty coming from wind energy has severe impacts on grid vulnerability to cascading overload failures under different contingency scenarios. Results also suggest that higher penetration levels of wind energy, if not managed appropriately, will add to this severity because higher uncertainties may be injected into weaker lines in a grid.
Impacts of Wind Power Uncertainty on GridI. INTRODUCTION
L ARGE-SCALE blackouts resulting from cascading failures induce considerable economic and social costs annually. Cascading failure (CF) is defined as a sequence of dependent failures of individual components that successively weakens the power system and could result in electrical instability and large scale blackouts and they originate from strong interdependencies inside the grid. Massive economic and social impacts of such events have motivated a great deal of research effort on studying the vulnerability of the power grids to CFs. Transmission line overload due to contingency is the most common initial cause of CFs in power systems.
Renewable energy integration and power system deregulation may drive the electric grid closer to its operation limits and introduce a large amount of uncertainty coming from their stochastic nature that changes grid's dynamic performance. One worrisome change is the increase in CFs involving wind farms [1] . Therefore, it is becoming more and more crucial to study the impact of these changes on the risk of CFs leading to blackouts. Henneaux et al. studied the impact of thermal effects on the risk of blackout for increased wind farms [2] . Authors in [3] proposed an online assessment system to evaluate, analyze and predict the CFs of a group of wind farms timely and effectively. Cascading tripping out of numerous wind turbines in China is analyzed in [4] to identify important factors contributing to the failures. Khazaei et al. in [5] , [6] proposed renewable energy aggregation to reduce the impacts of uncertainty on the network. Scala et al. in [7] found that the presence of fluctuations due to erratic renewable sources and customer demands increase the instability within an isolated segment of a power grid. However, none of these studies has evaluated the impacts of increased uncertainty injected from wind generation on the grid vulnerability to CFs in the complex interconnected power networks. Over the past two decades, several methodologies have been developed to study CFs such as Motter-Lai model [8] , [9] , CASCADE model [10] , Branching process model [11] , ORNL-PSerc-Alaska (OPA) model [12] [13] [14] , Manchester model [15] , and stochastic models [16] - [20] . However, these models do not allow considering high uncertainty level injected from renewable sources on the simulation of line outages during cascading failures. Carreras et al. in OPA model simulate cascading failure by taking into account a series of outages due to overloads and reconfiguration of the power flows in the grid with minimum loss of load through a DC optimal power flow (OPF) after the loss of one or several elements [12] . Wang et al. proposed a stochastic Markov model to capture the progression of CFs considering uncertainty coming from only electrical loads without accounting for thermal stability model for thermal relays tripping time [20] .
In this paper, we study the impact of wind generation uncertainty and penetration level on grid vulnerability to CF based on our developed uncertainty model in [21] . We propose an approach that combines OPA model with stochastic overload tripping mechanism to analyze and simulate cascading failures in a grid for different operation or contingency conditions under high penetration of wind uncertainty. The initial dispatch of the conventional generators are determined using an OPF calculation and the flow re-dispatch after every line trip is modeled using DC power flow (PF) and an online power balance algorithm for new islands to simulate corrective actions taken by the system operators. The stochastic line outage process is inspired by the approach proposed in [20] by taking into account the thermal stability model for relay tripping mechanism that helps define the most probable evolution path of cascading outages.
The main contributions of this paper can be listed as: a) Analysis of statistical properties of dynamic line flow and verification of its normality assumption using actual data for generation and load and proposed uncertainty model in [21] ; b) Development of a mixed OPF-stochastic model to analyze the impact of uncertainties introduced by renewables and simulate grid cascading failure evolution; c) Incorporation of thermal stability model and island detection algorithm for line outage simulation and power rebalance to simulate operators corrective actions, and d) Inclusion of time-space correlation of line flows uncertainty in the modeling of line tripping process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model that describes the uncertainty of injection power from generators and smart grid loads. Section III analyzes the statistical distribution of dynamic line flows and verifies their normality assumption in a power grid network which are derived from input power and grid network equations. Section IV proposes a mixed OPF-Stochastic model of cascading failure based on [12] , [20] . Section V provides numerical simulation results on the IEEE 300-bus system and Section VI gives conclusion and discusses future works.
II. WIND UNCERTAINTY MODELING
Uncertainties coming from different sources such as renewable generation and loads show different characteristics in terms of magnitude and frequency of occurrence. We proposed an uncertainty model in [21] that represents the injection power from each component (i.e. generator output power and load demand power) with two terms as shown in (1) .
where μ P (t) is the time-varying mean of the power signal or in other words it is what we expect to have for each component ahead of time and P (t) which is a zero mean signal, representing the uncertainty that may come from forecast error or mismatch in output power for conventional generators. Note that in this study, the output power of generators including conventional and wind generation and demand power from loads are modeled with the above representation. Fig. 1 shows this rep- resentation for output power signal of a wind generator as an example.
For grid vulnerability studies, two characteristics of uncertainty coming from different sources are important; its size and dynamics. The probability density function (PDF) of a random variable is a common statistic used to evaluate the probability of different values of uncertainty as shown in Fig. 1 . It is usually of interest to fit an approximate PDF to the empirical distribution when characterizing forecasting error [22] .
The dynamics of uncertainty is related to their variation over time and contains useful information about their nature. Based on proposed model by [20] , frequency components of injected power in buses which will translate into frequency components of line flows have a direct impact on grid vulnerability to random disturbances. Therefore, to identify the dynamic behavior of uncertainty coming from each source, their occupied bandwidth (OBW) is calculated using the power spectrum of the uncertainty signal P (t).
The power spectrum S xx (f ) of a time series x(t) describes the distribution of frequency components composing that signal as shown in Fig. 1 . The power spectral density (PSD) of a signal refers to the spectral energy distribution per unit of time. The spectrum of physical processes often contains essential information about the nature of them. One particular information that can be useful for our purpose is the OBW of the signal. It can clearly represent the dynamics of signal that in our case shows the dynamics of uncertainty for different sources. The mathematical representation of PSD can be expressed by (2) :
wherex(ω) is the Fourier transform of the signal and γ(τ ) is the autocorrelation function which describes the correlation between values of the process at different times, as a function of the two times or of the time lag. In this study, the 99% OBW is considered as a metric to show the dynamics of the uncertainty. The OBW is the bandwidth containing 99% of the total integrated power in the spectrum. Using real data for generation including wind and conventional generators and loads from Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) power system with 4 second resolution and forecasting using Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) approach, it is found that wind generation injects the highest amount of uncertainty into the grid in terms of its bandwidth and magnitude [21] . Table I shows the 99% OBW, Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), and Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) for each uncertainty source. The OBW of line flow uncertainty can be calculated similarly which will be later utilized in the development of our stochastic line tripping model.
III. NORMALITY VERIFICATION FOR LINE FLOWS
In our line outage model presented in the next section, the line overload distance is calculated based on the Gaussian assumption for line flow uncertainty as proposed by the authors in [20] . Authors in [20] assume Gaussian or normal distribution for the line flows without accounting for wind generation uncertainty in the network. Therefore, it is of interest to verify this assumption for the line flows of a grid with high penetration of wind energy with the uncertainty model proposed earlier. This enables us to calculate the overload distance for the line flows which will be later used in the line tripping model presented in Section IV-A. The IEEE 300 bus system with 411 transmission branches and several added wind generators is selected to implement the proposed uncertainty model and investigate the normality assumption for the line flows.
The initial observations on the line flows uncertainty distributions reveals a close proximity to normal distribution. There is numerous approach for normality test in the literature each suitable for different needs. Kurtosis and Skewness coefficients are used widely for normality test for large samples as many other tests such as Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Jarque-Bera test, and Shapiro-Wilk test almost always reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution for large samples. This is because when the number of samples gets larger, even the smallest deviation from perfect normality will lead to a significant result. Kurtosis is a measure of whether the data are heavy-tailed or lighttailed relative to normal distribution. Skewness is a measure of symmetry, or more precisely, the lack of symmetry. A perfect normal distribution would have both kurtosis and skewness coefficients equal to zero. However, in [19] and [20] the ±2 range for these measures are introduced as the acceptable range in order to prove normal univariate distribution. We will use this range in our verification step.
The absolute value for both measures are calculated for flows of all 411 lines in the IEEE 300 bus system and then sorted in ascending order. Fig. 2 shows the results for the line flows uncertainty kurtosis and skewness. Kurtosis coefficients are sorted in ascending order and the corresponding skewness coefficients are superimposed in the figure to consider both measures simultaneously. It is found that 95% of the lines have kurtosis and skewness coefficients less than 5 with 85% (349 lines) within acceptable range of 2. This means that majority of lines satisfy the normality criteria with a trivial deviation from a perfect normal distribution. Table II summarizes the results of normality test for grid lines based on kurtosis measure. It is also found that 59% of the lines that are outside of the acceptable bound (with coefficient larger than 2) are connected directly to generation buses as shown in Table II . Our statistical analysis on line capacities for the actual grid data from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) suggests that these lines tend to have larger loading margin compared to other lines. Hence, their overload probability is relatively low. It implies that we can use Gaussian assumption for the line flows in our line outage model considering the fact that the lines with larger coefficients will not frequently get tripped and don't have much impact on our stochastic model.
IV. CASCADING FAILURE SIMULATION
This study aims to evaluate the grid vulnerability to blackouts from uncertainty viewpoint. We propose a mixed OPF-stochastic approach that simulates the uncertainty in the line flow process while simultaneously calculates the flow re-dispatch based on the DC power flow. Note that unlike the OPA model proposed by Carreras et al. in [12] , in our study the OPF is only used to determine the initial dispatch of the conventional generators based on forecast profiles for loads and wind generation and then the flow re-dispatch is calculated based on a DC power flow and power balance algorithm for the newly formed islands. This helps simulate the CF process more accurately since in real time there is not enough time for OPF analyses during escalation phase of the failures. The thermal stability model for overhead transmission lines is combined with stochastic model presented by [20] to simulate the most probable path of line outages under high penetration of wind uncertainty. Furthermore, an automatic power balance algorithm combined with an online island detection algorithm are introduced to simulate the corrective actions taken by the system operators to alleviate operating contingencies. The flow chart of the simulation procedure is depicted in Fig. 3 .
A. DC Power Flow and Line Overload Modeling
Determining the steady-state operating conditions of the power grid requires solving the full power flow equations that provide information about the voltage magnitudes and phases and the active and reactive power flows through each transmission line. Unfortunately, solving repeatedly the full nonlinear power flow equations becomes computationally prohibitive due to numerous solutions during the evolution of CF. In addition, we are only interested in evaluating the impact of wind uncertainty on grid vulnerability to CF that doesn't necessarily require complete nonlinear network equations. For all these reasons we used DC power flow approximation [25] to recalculate the flow dispatch of the power grid at each time.
The power flow equations for a power grid with n nodes and m links can be expressed as:
where P (t) represents the vector of injected real power, θ(t) the nodal voltage angles, and F (t) the flows on the lines. The matrix B (t) is defined as
where y l (t) = 1/x l is the line admittance; diag(y l (t)) represents a diagonal matrix with entries of {y l (t), l = 1, 2, . . . , m}. A : (A l,k ) m ×n is the line-node incidence matrix, arbitrarily oriented and defined as: A l,i = 1; A l,j = −1, if the lth line is from node i to node j and A l,k = 0, k = i, j. Note that we assume that all the bus voltages in the grid network are closed to the rated voltage levels. The standard version of the DC OPF introduced by [26] is solved to find the initial dispatch of the generators. The problem formulation is based on total cost minimization and is as follows:
where f i P is the polynomial cost function of generator i, P i g is the output power of generator i, and P j l is demand power of load j. Note that (8) denotes that the total power generated and consumed must balance. During the cascading failure, the power balance of each island is maintained by minimizing the total load drop constrained to maximum capacity of generators. This algorithm is presented in Section IV-C.
Using the uncertainty modeling discussed earlier, the injected power at each bus would be presented with two terms. Then using this representation we can form the mean and covariance matrices. The covariance matrix C F (t, τ ) is calculated for each time step using the sliding window method as a m × m matrix:
(10) where F l (t) is the uncertainty term in flow signal of line 'l' at time t and C ij = cov( F i (t), F j (t − τ )). In the simulation we utilize the unbiased estimates as cov (A(j), B(j))
for the sample j of flow uncertainty. Note that sliding window method for covariance calculation selects a predetermined number (N) of observations of line flow errors and then puts them in the observation matrix. Each element of covariance matrix (C ij ) is calculated based on the observation matrix. The variance for flow process of each line can then be calculated by taking square root of each diagonal element in covariance matrix with σ F l (t) = C F l , l (t, 0) . With a Gaussian assumption for the distribution of F l (t) in [20] , the overloading probability ρ l (t) = p{|F l (t)| > F max l } can be calculated using Q-function as below:
where
is the normalized overload distance of the lth line and Q-function as
In an actual power grid, the overload status of the line flows can be expected to have both temporal and spatial correlation with each other. Most lines stay safely below their capacities under normal operating conditions; while during the escalation phase of CFs, some of the lines may become overloaded and get tripped within a very short time. Using the covariance matrix C F (t, 0), we define Mahalanobis overload distance [27] as
Finally, using the normalized overload distance (a l ) and overloading probability (ρ l ) for each line we can calculate the mean overload time for flow process F l (t) as follows [20] :
where BW l is the equivalent bandwidth of the flow process for the lth line and can be calculated using the spectral power density (SPD) of the flow process discussed earlier [21] .
B. Tripping Mechanism and Relay Model
The trip time of thermal overload relays is determined based on the maximum allowable current flowing in the conductor without causing thermal instability. Generally, the overload relays for HV transmission lines have time-dependent tripping characteristic, which is determined using the well-known dynamic thermal balance between heat gains and losses in the conductor [28] . The maximum or hot spot temperature determines the time to trip for thermal relays and considering initial operation current and applying necessary changes, the time to trip can be calculated using a variation form of the tripping mechanism introduced in [29] in which we replace the current with the flow measured in per unit value assuming a flat voltage profile V=1.0 p.u. across the whole network, which is valid for DC flow analysis.
where F is overloaded line flow (p.u.), F op is initial operating flow (p.u.), F max is the line flow threshold, and T th is thermal time constant which is related to conductor type and environmental parameters such as wind speed and ambient temperature [30] . In this study, it is assumed that all transmission lines use typical HAWK (477 kcmil) ACSR conductor with T th = 450 sec. In this study, for the tripping mechanism, both relay time to trip and overloading probability are considered simultaneously to select the most probable line trip during the escalation phase of CF. At every time step, first the time to trip for each overloaded line is calculated, then using normalized overload distance (a l ) and overloading probability (ρ l ) the mean overload time (τ u l ) is determined. If relay time to trip is larger than the mean overload time, the trip timer is set to zero, otherwise the trip timer is set to the relay time to trip. This tripping mechanism enables us to model the stochastic process of CF and identify the most probable path for its propagation.
After every line trip, the topology of the grid changes and so as the flow distribution across the grid network. Therefore, some new lines may become overloaded and some of the overloaded lines may not be overloaded anymore. Therefore, an update of line states after every line trip in the relay tripping time is necessary. The time to trip of each overloaded transmission line is determined according to (14) and then after every line outage, the time to trip for other overloaded lines are updated. Note that updating stage for trip time considers the overload duration for each relay from the first overloading instant. In other words, our relay model is with memory, since the overloaded lines are already heated up due to excess power flowing through them and the new time to trip accounts for the gained heat. This concept is illustrated in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4(a) shows the power flow of three different transmission lines each overloaded initially. The time to trip for each relay is shown in Fig. 4(b) . According to tripping mechanism explained earlier, after the first trip (t = T A ) both Relay B and C need to update their timers. With memory effect assumption for relay operation, the new time to trip for relay C is t C 1 t r . Note that this updated time to trip is smaller than that of memoryless operation (t C 1 t r ), which is calculated based on the flow F l (T A ) at t = T A according to (14) . And the difference just eqauls | = |, i.e., the elapsed time from the first overload instant to T A . Similarly, the memory effect also causes smaller time to trip in Relay B. Also note that for relay B, the overload flow at t = T A is larger than initial overload flow at t = 0, hence the new time to trip is smaller while the overload flow for relay C at t = T A is smaller than initial overload flow at t = 0 which means larger time to trip.
C. Island Detection and Power Balance
Successive line tripping during escalation phase of CF usually causes the formation of several islands in the power network. The electrical frequency of the system is driven based on the power balance according to the well-known electro-mechanical equation [31] 
where P Gen is the total produced power, P Load is the total consumed power, H is the global inertia, and f is the electrical frequency of the system. The frequency in power systems is considered a global parameter and cannot be influenced by a small section. However, when a part of network becomes islanded, the inertia and the load balance depend only on generators and loads inside the island where shedding actions may be necessary. In the power balance algorithm for any island, the total load and total generation capacity are compared to each other. If the total demand exceeds the maximum available generation, some load shedding is necessary to maintain the power balance. Similarly, if total demand is smaller than the current generation, one or several generation units should drop their generation. The flow chart of the automatic power balance algorithm is shown in Fig. 5 . Suppose that there are k separate islands in the grid at t = t 0 . If a line trip at t = t 0 + Δt results into formation of a new island, it is necessary to run the power balance algorithm for both newly formed island and the mother island that it separated from. Therefore, the power balance algorithm will balance the generation and load for the two clusters for the next power flow solution.
The power balance algorithm starts with collecting generation and load settings of the two new islands. The bus type vector for each island is defined as S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s m } where s i ∈ [0, 1]. For each bus s i = 1 represents a generation bus and s i = 0 is either load or connection bus. If there is no generation bus in each island ( s i = 0), the total cluster is de-energized and algorithm will cut the total load of the island. Otherwise, a comparison is made between the total load and the total generation and maximum available generation to balance the power accordingly to minimize the total load loss. Note that generation or load adjustment is distributed meaning that balancing adjustment is applied as percentage to every generator or load.
An automatic island detection algorithm inspired by the approach proposed in [31] is used after each trip to identify newly formed islands. Clusters of generator(s) and load(s) that are not connected to the grid are called island(s). The algorithm consists of three steps; connectivity check, critical events identification, and island identification. Connectivity check determines how many islands are present in the power system, and their structure. Critical event detection identifies which breakers should create an island if opened. And the final step, island detection, identifies the buses belonging to each possible island and calculates their load balance. The actual dispatch of the network is not required for the algorithm since it only depends on gird topology (grid incidence matrix A) and generators location. Assuming the resistance for all lines in the network equal to 1 Ω and using the Kirchhoff's current and voltage laws, the equations describing system behavior are solved. To detect buses belonging to each island, generators are activated (assuming output current of 1 A) one at a time. After identifying all present separate islands in the grid, their power balance is maintained by shedding actions. For detailed island detection algorithm please refer to [31] .
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Two different scenarios are considered to study the impact of wind uncertainty on grid vulnerability and for each of them, some of the conventional generators in the original IEEE 300 bus system are replaced with wind farms. In the first scenario 11 conventional generators are replaced with wind generators at buses 80,88,125,128,156,199,222,256,258,262,295. The load and generation data are received from Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) with 4-second sampling rate. The high sampling rate for data allows us to capture high-frequency dynamics of different sources. These data are for numerous wind generators, load demand, and different types of conventional generations. In this study, fossil fuel generators and cogeneration are used as conventional generation and load data are scaled according to the original settings of the IEEE 300 bus system. Uncertainty modeling of loads and generations are based on the model proposed in [21] . The Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) forecasting technique for 30 minutes horizon is employed to model the initial uncertainty signal coming from wind generation and electrical loads based on the actual data. The increased uncertainty level models the use of different forecasting techniques and horizons with different accuracy and characteristics and illustratively shows how the accuracy of the forecasting method affects the results. Simulations of the CF scenarios are performed in the MATLAB environment and MATPOWER is used for OPF and PF calculations [26] . Wind installation settings are shown in Table III for the two studied scenarios. Note that wind generation capacity is selected the same as the IEEE-300 bus system original setting for conventional generators. The initial operating equilibrium and conditions (G(0), L(0), θ(0), F (0)) are taken or derived from the power flow solution. The equivalent bandwidth of flow process for each line under the initial uncertainty level is then calculated and stored to use later on stochastic tripping mechanism. Since the original setting of the IEEE 300 bus system doesn't provide enough information on line capacities, they are set as F max = max{η|F (0)|, 2.0(p.u.)} with η = 1.20. Here we take F (0) as the rational flow distribution under normal operating conditions and assume that the line capacity allows a load increase up to 20% [20] . Note that we select a near congestion operating conditions for the grid to better see the impact of increased uncertainty from wind generation on multiple line overloads leading to CFs. The minimum of line capacity is set to be 2.0 p.u. so that the vibration in the lines which usually carry small flows will not cause frequent line trips.
A. Wind Uncertainty Level and Grid Vulnerability
The first scenario is considered to study the impacts of forecasting relative error which comes into the picture in the form of uncertainty from wind generation. For this scenario, the uncertainty signal magnitude for wind generator is increased by factor γ = To see the impact of larger forecasting errors on grid vulnerability to overload CFs, γ is increased from 1 to 5 with 0.25 steps to find the uncertainty level in which the first CF occurs. All other settings of the system remains the same during first scenario. Table IV shows the results for increased wind uncertainty level.
For γ between (1-2.25) there is no tripped line thus no CF happens for this uncertainty range. Moving beyond γ = 2.25 multiple line overloads are observed that leads to a series of CFs that forms multiple islands and isolated buses. Automatic power balance on each island causes the load to be dropped to a certain level that can be supplied by generators inside the island. Successive line trips continue until all line flows drop safely below line thresholds. Also, the first and second tripped lines and their respective times are given to identify the most vulnerable lines in the network for a given wind uncertainty.
γ is increased further to see the impacts of even larger uncertainty levels on severity of CF. Fig. 6 shows the total number of tripped lines and total load shedding percent for different wind uncertainty levels. As the γ increases, the more lines get tripped during CF which in turn leads into formation of more islands and larger load shedding as shown in Fig. 6 .
The evolution process of CFs for different wind uncertainty level is shown in Fig. 7 . All the curves are comparable to actual failures recorded in history and reported in [19] . Each evolution curve consists of two phases, the escalation phase in which the line trip rate is as high as 12 lines per minute, and the damping phase with line trip rate of approximately one line per minute. Also, it is found that as wind uncertainty level increases, the first trip happens earlier than lower wind uncertainty level which indicates that the minimum safety time of the entire network decreases under the same operating conditions. For example, the black bold line shows the cumulative number of line trips for uncertainty level increased by the factor 5. As compared with uncertainty level increased by factor 2.5 (green line with square marker), the former results into higher number of tripped lines due to high level of wind uncertainty. Also, high uncertainty level causes contingency in multiple lines earlier compared to lower uncertainty levels. For example, the earliest cascading process is associated with the highest uncertainty level, γ = 5, as indicated in Table IV and happens after 15 minutes of beginning of simulation, which implies that as more uncertainty is injected to the grid, its survival time gets shorter.
B. Wind Penetration Level and Grid Vulnerability
The second scenario aims to investigate the impacts of increased penetration level of wind energy on grid vulnerability to cascading overload failures. For this scenario, wind penetration ratio is defined as α =
, where P max G,wind is the total wind generator capacity and P max G,total is the total grid generation capacity. By replacing more conventional generators from original setting of the network with wind generators in addition to those already installed, α is increased to see the impacts of higher wind penetration on grid vulnerability. Note that small to medium generators are selected to be replaced with additional wind farms to have smaller steps for α. All other settings of the system remains the same.
The results for increased wind penetration are shown in Table V . Starting from initial α = 0.036, there are no line trips until α = 0.09 where line 137 gets tripped at minute 2. To see further impacts of higher wind penetration, α is increased to 0.223 by replacing more mid-size conventional generators with wind generators. Fig. 8 shows the total number of trip lines and load shedding for each penetration level α. It is found that the higher the wind penetration ratio, the more line trip and load shedding occurs in the network. In other words, given the same settings for all other generations and loads of the network, under congestion conditions in the network, installing more wind farms increases the risk of blackout due to cascading overload failures.
It is also observed that for all CFs beyond α = 0.09, line 137 is the first line getting tripped and it happens almost at the same time for all α above 0.09. This could be explained considering the location of the new wind farm installation. A certain wind farm added to the network at a particular location injects additional uncertainty to one of the backbone transmission lines in the network leading to further line trips and propagation of CFs. However, the second line trip is different for each penetration level which determines the cascading path and eventually the total number of trips and load shedding. This is particularly interesting for planning purposes, since this will detect the most vulnerable lines of the network.
The evolution process of CFs for the second scenario is shown in Fig. 9 for each penetration level. The triggering event for every one of them is the same, however, due to a different level of uncertainty coming from wind generation, each failure evolves into a different path. This potentially identifies the weakest backbone line of the network according to the new configuration of wind generators. For example, black bold line shows the cumulative number of line trips for 9% wind penetration level where starts nearly 5 minutes after simulation start and stabilizes at minute 28. While, increasing wind penetration to 22.3% (green line with square marker) results into higher tripping rate, as large as 20 lines per minute during escalation phase of cascading failure, and more total number of tripped lines.
C. Overload Distance Analysis During Cascading Failure
As mentioned earlier in Section IV, the overload distance of line flows can be a good indicator of the behavior of the power grid during normal operation and CF. The Mahalanobis overload distance (D m ) shows the overload distance of the whole network and considers the correlation between line flows using flow covariance matrix, while the Euclidian overload distance (D e ) assumes no correlation among the line flows and considers them as independent random variables. Fig. 10 shows both D m and D e during normal operation of the system (without increase in wind uncertainty) and CF resulting from increased wind uncertainty by the factor γ = 4.5.
From Fig. 10 we can see that Mahalanobis overload distance (D m ) is always greater than Euclidian overload distance (D e ) either for normal operation or during the CF. This verifies the fact that in an actual power network, the line flows have a strong correlation with each other that causes a more robust and reliable operation compared to independent line flows. The first line trip happens at t = 25 min. From t = 0 to first tripping instant D e is smaller for the case leading to CF. This is because of increased wind uncertainty compared to normal operation. In other words, increased uncertainty in line flows results into smaller overload distance and consequently higher chance for CF in the power system. Another interesting finding is that both D m and D e show an increasing trend as line tripping spreads throughout the grid. This is because of the load shedding actions to maintain power balance for newly formed islands in the network. As more generation units are separated from formed islands, larger portions of electrical loads get curtailed which means reduction in line flows and according to (8) the overall distance of line flows from their threshold increases. This also explains why all CFs tend to stop after several line trips if appropriate load shedding mechanisms were employed in the operation and control of the grid.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, we analyzed the impacts of wind generation on grid vulnerability to cascading overload failures in terms of its penetration and uncertainty level. We first verified the normality assumption for line flow uncertainty based on actual generation and load data and then using a mixed DC OPF-stochastic model and thermal stability model for overload lines simulated the cascading failure in power grids with high penetration of wind generation. In addition, the automatic power balance and island detection algorithm are incorporated to consider corrective actions during propagation of failures. Two scenarios are considered to study the impact of wind generation uncertainty on CFs. First, it is found that increased uncertainty injected from wind generation could cause cascading failures in the grid and the higher the injected uncertainty the more severe the situation in terms of the total number of tripped lines and load shedding. Second, our analyses show that given the current operating condition of the grid, increasing wind penetration to a certain level may result into cascading overload failures and higher penetration makes the grid more vulnerable to failures. In addition, overload distance of the network as a measure of grid safety to CF is analyzed for normal and contingency operating conditions. Simulation results suggest that appropriate management of uncertainties via energy storage or advanced forecasting techniques is necessary in order to achieve sustained growth of renewable generation in current grid operation. In the future, we may consider more detailed and accurate models in our study of interdependence of cascading failures, renewable generation and smart grid loads, such as full AC power flow in the grid modeling and Geographical Information System (GIS) that indicates the potential location of renewable integration and additional types of contingencies other than overload failures.
